Institutional Framework for National Security

When an event of the size of the recent terrorist strike in Mumbai occcurs, there is an immediate consensus on the need to create an institutional framework for national security. History has proved time and again that such a consensus had occured on numerous occasions in the past only to have been given an undignified burial in a bureaucratic crypt each and every time. Why does this happen? Let me hazard a guess.

This has to do with institutional frameworks - a common euphemism for integrating structures in organizational design. National security in India has always been a concept whose understanding has been siloed by the type, nature and scope of the organization that has been reposed by the responsibility for that silo. Traditionally, these silos have been that of Defence, Border and Coast Guard, Police, Intelligence and the various Investigative agencies governed by a bureaucratic maze comprising the defence and home ministries at the central level and the bureaucratic state government machinery at the other. The keyword is "bureaucratic maze". And there is a reason for it.

Our bureaucrats inherited a privileged position in society from our colonial past and they have thrived on its self serving system of pomp and pelf. Politicians and bureaucrats operate back-to-back to preserve this system and resort to connivance and collusion to thwart any attempts to rectify the system if it would in some way reduce their role or importance. Rampant corruption, callousness and debilitating inefficiency are endemic to the system that nurtures the bureaucratic system. It throttles any talent that threatens their attempts to enlarge status and privileges.

"National Security" unfortunately, appears to be beyond the comprehension of the average bureaucrat, so accustomed to the sychopant salute of a security guard outside their posh offices in Delhi or other districts and state capitals. Bureaucracy understands the "National" bit. the "Security" bit is a bit hazy even by itself. But put together into single quotes - "National Security" - is a completely baffling subject, especially in its ramifications. It is not static in nature nor is it a closed system that can work in isolation indefinitely. So the bureaucratic approach to this subject has been a cautious, time-consuming creep up into positions of power within the security apparatus, grasping at fleeting notions of security concepts to appear momentarily knowledgeable at least to the extent required for the occasional sound byte and needed only until they exited the structure on moving to other more lucrative positions of power and pelf in departments that were less euphemistic. All this, fully knowing that the various silos would continue to function effectively in their respective domains without ever needing interorganizational coordination or seek arbitration when there was a conflict of interest. Here, the bureaucracy reigned supreme. This was their ultimate source of power - the ability to arbitrate between two silos. It preserved their system while threatening each other laterally. And in each silo, there would be gladiators who would learn to move ahead despite the system and die when needed. The overhead costs were only a medal, a silo specific funeral and the occasional cheque or two. Total control - power and pelf at its best.

But times are changing. An integrated headquarters for defence was mooted nearly 30 years ago soon after the 1971 Indo-Pak war when the need have a coordinated strategy for defence became apparent. In 1984, terrorism came to India with a big bang and the bureaucracy initiated a chain of events that led to the formation of the NSG, a miracle of careful silo-reengineering. Then came sustained Punjab insurgency requiring close coordination between police, intelligence and defence silos within the jurisdiction of a single state. The Sri Lankan engagement was primarily an Army engagement localized to a single silo hence quite manageable even though the intelligence silo appeared to often work at cross purposes with the defence silo on that occassion.

The Mumbai blasts of 1993 added a regional and an external dimension to security concerns and the bureaucracy muddled through that crisis by creating one committee after another to educate themselves and finally did nothing about it. Security itself was never as rewarding as other bureaucratic functions, except when it came to defence procurement. A procedure was finally drafted for defence that kept the primary stakeholders out of the final decision processes. IC 817 hijacking was an unique twist, but its ramifiations were again minimized to one or two silos. Then Kargil - defence and external intelligence silos managed the situation.

Then came the 9/11 syndrome and the Al Qaida shaped outfits called the Lashkar, the Jaish, the Huji and the Indian Mujahideen. Interestingly, all appeared to be conveniently in the middle of the state list - the police and intelligence silo - still manageable. The various insurgencies across India and that in Kashmir kept the defence and intelligence silos active.

And then came Mumbai - an approach from the sea (coast guard) possibly from a mothership (customs/coast guard) guided by a naval escort (defence), landed at the gateway (customs), crossed over into the Mumbai police jurisdiction (state silo), entered the hotels and other internationally well recognized premises and opened fire on anyone and everyone present. The situation quickly escalated into an international event and sucked in the defence, intelligence, investigative and police silos even as domestic and international media management became a new requirement for special forces strike units. The bureaucrats went into hiding, chosing to send a junior spokesman to read a printed statement on the status of the operations in Mumbai. A junior who did not know how to modulate his smirk of importance in the face of intense media attention. A junior bureaucrat, just in case someone knowledgeable asked a pertinant question, it could be dismissed as the inept response of a junior bureaucrat. Mostly, it would avoid embarassment to a senior bureaucrat attempting to define "national security" and save them from appearing as surprised as (for want of a better analogy) a defecating fawn caught in the headlights of a vehicle in the middle of the night.

The Mumbai situation was completely new and untested waters for any silo based approach and the PM has already announced the need for an institutional framework for national security. The knee jerk reaction of the Maharashtra government was to set up another silo - an NSG for Mumbai. That soon had Bangalore and Chennai and Kolkata clamouring for their own NSGs. At 800 crores per piece, it was a lucrative silo with its own types of perks - the image of a local gun-toting black clad personal security lads was compelling.

The bureaucrats are already hard at work to see how they can preserve and extend their power and pelf into what would be a key organization of the future. The people however, need to ensure our bureaucrats are only a component, not the driver in the decision hierarchy that would be driven by real talent drawn from the various silos and empowered by a federal act. And that is going to be a tough call, given their entrenched positions - very much like the last gunman in Room 206 of Hotel Taj Mahal.

New NSG-type unit for Maharashtra - typical knee jerk reaction of a jaded bureaucracy

The fires at the Taj, the Trident Oberoi and the Nariman House are still burning and our politicians and bureaucrats have come up with their formula for a silver bullet against the scourge of terror - a local force patterned on the NSG. The sheer audacity for politician to make that wide and sweeping statement without understanding its full import is a typical knee jerk reaction that one has come to expect from them. Unfortunately, it is not the politician who probably originated the idea. It is probably our omnipresent bureaucracy that did the background work to facilitate that statement. But do our bureaucrats understand what it entails? Who is most equipped to even arbitrate the discussion on whether a country like India would be most benefited if it were raised as a central, federal or state level organization? What would it take for a state like Maharashtra to raise an unit patterned on the NSG? Would it be a viable local counter terror response unit capable of undertaking the mission? To understand this we need to get to the bottom of the unit on which it is being patterned - the NSG itself.

The NSG is a voluntary force of professionals drawn from the Army and a number of para military organizations - the BSF, CRPF among others and represents a dated attempt to create a federal special forces unit that has the ethos of the Army Special Forces and an administrative apparatus that would enable such a force to operate under a federal ambit in conjunction with a states existing police organization. As such, it is organized into core strike elements - the Special Action Groups - drawing its ranks mainly from the Indian Army special forces units, the cordon elements - the Special Ranger Groups - drawing its ranks from the paramilitary forces, and numerous ancillary specialist units for combat, communication and logistic support and a training organization for induction and development. Other elements, especially its vital and integrated air component that was envisaged in its original vision is best left out of this discussion for the moment. The strike element draws its culture and ethos from an Army that is battle hardened through years of training, indoctrination and almost continuous exposure to low intensity conflicts and counter-insurgency operations in India and in other locations worldwide.

A force for Maharashtra would necessarily have to be a special police unit and would operate within the existing state police organizational hierarchy and be funded through state revenues. Mumbai, being the commercial capital, can most definitely finance the required headcount and provide them with the best equipment and training available to the world. So where is the problem? The problem lies in developing and sustaining the special forces culture and ethos.

The life of a soldier in a counter-terror unit is finite. It is an extremely high energy environment - both physically and mentally demanding - and it takes nearly a year for a soldier drawn from the Army to complete the full acculturation process. And for a new comer, the novelty wears out after a few operations as other normal life time events occur. It is an experience organization as distinguished from a career organization. People need to move on. New blood needs to be infused periodically and this new blood has to have a basic quality and calibre. How will an already overburdened police organization with its myriad responsibilities and numerous ongoing issues provide an nurturing environment for an ethos that takes even an organization like the Army years to build and then its designated role oriented environment, to sustain?

Changing Nature of Warfare

The nature of warfare has been changing over several past decades and very visibly since Sep 2001. The trend first arrived into our collective consciousness during the 1984 army operations at the Golden Temple in Amritsar and exploded onto the mainstream during the 1993 Mumbai blasts. It is warfare that trancends borders in a confusing kalideoscope of characters, events and issues, defying nation state boundaries and leaving mayhem in its path. And into this evil brew it brings religion as the interorganizational strategy to manage the environment and to attract, acquire and motivate its deadly talent.

The NSG, our primary federal counter-terror response unit, setup in the aftermath of the 1984 operations, was patterned at the tactical level on the famed German border guard unit - the GSG9 - and at the strategic level on the American Special Operations Command. It foresaw a high-tech, fully integrated air and ground elements operating within a federal ambit. It ended up enmeshed into a outmoded colonial internal security apparatus, that is even today, a state subject. The dichotomy ensured its ruin. Seen increasingly in its alternate avatar - the comic spectacle of highly visibile gun-toting personal security guards accompanying politicians of all hues - it was reduced to yet another para-military unit under a government ministry utterly incapable of understanding its role. That they can still function in times of crisis should only be attributed to absolute professionalism and to the talent of individuals within its ranks who continue to operate against all odds despite its phenomenonally outmoded ecosystem.
Changing such a well entrenched system requires a powerful intent, the likes of which we will probably never see until the rebirth of the collective conciousness and a strong belief in the concept called "India" - always ephemeral, euphemistic and yet so tantalising for those who can see it occassionally. Maybe it is the attempt to define a region as a nationstate that is creating the problem. Maybe India has always represented the concept of a region which can let a billion nation states coexist - each man, women and child a nation state. And imagine the power of intent if the whole region shrugged off old differences and came together to fight this scourge? Thats still a long while away.

It is however strange coincidence that the NSG bears the sign of a "Sudarshan Chakra", the ultimate weapon of the collective conciousnessness. Maybe, just maybe, its time for rebirth.