Institutional Framework for National Security

When an event of the size of the recent terrorist strike in Mumbai occcurs, there is an immediate consensus on the need to create an institutional framework for national security. History has proved time and again that such a consensus had occured on numerous occasions in the past only to have been given an undignified burial in a bureaucratic crypt each and every time. Why does this happen? Let me hazard a guess.

This has to do with institutional frameworks - a common euphemism for integrating structures in organizational design. National security in India has always been a concept whose understanding has been siloed by the type, nature and scope of the organization that has been reposed by the responsibility for that silo. Traditionally, these silos have been that of Defence, Border and Coast Guard, Police, Intelligence and the various Investigative agencies governed by a bureaucratic maze comprising the defence and home ministries at the central level and the bureaucratic state government machinery at the other. The keyword is "bureaucratic maze". And there is a reason for it.

Our bureaucrats inherited a privileged position in society from our colonial past and they have thrived on its self serving system of pomp and pelf. Politicians and bureaucrats operate back-to-back to preserve this system and resort to connivance and collusion to thwart any attempts to rectify the system if it would in some way reduce their role or importance. Rampant corruption, callousness and debilitating inefficiency are endemic to the system that nurtures the bureaucratic system. It throttles any talent that threatens their attempts to enlarge status and privileges.

"National Security" unfortunately, appears to be beyond the comprehension of the average bureaucrat, so accustomed to the sychopant salute of a security guard outside their posh offices in Delhi or other districts and state capitals. Bureaucracy understands the "National" bit. the "Security" bit is a bit hazy even by itself. But put together into single quotes - "National Security" - is a completely baffling subject, especially in its ramifications. It is not static in nature nor is it a closed system that can work in isolation indefinitely. So the bureaucratic approach to this subject has been a cautious, time-consuming creep up into positions of power within the security apparatus, grasping at fleeting notions of security concepts to appear momentarily knowledgeable at least to the extent required for the occasional sound byte and needed only until they exited the structure on moving to other more lucrative positions of power and pelf in departments that were less euphemistic. All this, fully knowing that the various silos would continue to function effectively in their respective domains without ever needing interorganizational coordination or seek arbitration when there was a conflict of interest. Here, the bureaucracy reigned supreme. This was their ultimate source of power - the ability to arbitrate between two silos. It preserved their system while threatening each other laterally. And in each silo, there would be gladiators who would learn to move ahead despite the system and die when needed. The overhead costs were only a medal, a silo specific funeral and the occasional cheque or two. Total control - power and pelf at its best.

But times are changing. An integrated headquarters for defence was mooted nearly 30 years ago soon after the 1971 Indo-Pak war when the need have a coordinated strategy for defence became apparent. In 1984, terrorism came to India with a big bang and the bureaucracy initiated a chain of events that led to the formation of the NSG, a miracle of careful silo-reengineering. Then came sustained Punjab insurgency requiring close coordination between police, intelligence and defence silos within the jurisdiction of a single state. The Sri Lankan engagement was primarily an Army engagement localized to a single silo hence quite manageable even though the intelligence silo appeared to often work at cross purposes with the defence silo on that occassion.

The Mumbai blasts of 1993 added a regional and an external dimension to security concerns and the bureaucracy muddled through that crisis by creating one committee after another to educate themselves and finally did nothing about it. Security itself was never as rewarding as other bureaucratic functions, except when it came to defence procurement. A procedure was finally drafted for defence that kept the primary stakeholders out of the final decision processes. IC 817 hijacking was an unique twist, but its ramifiations were again minimized to one or two silos. Then Kargil - defence and external intelligence silos managed the situation.

Then came the 9/11 syndrome and the Al Qaida shaped outfits called the Lashkar, the Jaish, the Huji and the Indian Mujahideen. Interestingly, all appeared to be conveniently in the middle of the state list - the police and intelligence silo - still manageable. The various insurgencies across India and that in Kashmir kept the defence and intelligence silos active.

And then came Mumbai - an approach from the sea (coast guard) possibly from a mothership (customs/coast guard) guided by a naval escort (defence), landed at the gateway (customs), crossed over into the Mumbai police jurisdiction (state silo), entered the hotels and other internationally well recognized premises and opened fire on anyone and everyone present. The situation quickly escalated into an international event and sucked in the defence, intelligence, investigative and police silos even as domestic and international media management became a new requirement for special forces strike units. The bureaucrats went into hiding, chosing to send a junior spokesman to read a printed statement on the status of the operations in Mumbai. A junior who did not know how to modulate his smirk of importance in the face of intense media attention. A junior bureaucrat, just in case someone knowledgeable asked a pertinant question, it could be dismissed as the inept response of a junior bureaucrat. Mostly, it would avoid embarassment to a senior bureaucrat attempting to define "national security" and save them from appearing as surprised as (for want of a better analogy) a defecating fawn caught in the headlights of a vehicle in the middle of the night.

The Mumbai situation was completely new and untested waters for any silo based approach and the PM has already announced the need for an institutional framework for national security. The knee jerk reaction of the Maharashtra government was to set up another silo - an NSG for Mumbai. That soon had Bangalore and Chennai and Kolkata clamouring for their own NSGs. At 800 crores per piece, it was a lucrative silo with its own types of perks - the image of a local gun-toting black clad personal security lads was compelling.

The bureaucrats are already hard at work to see how they can preserve and extend their power and pelf into what would be a key organization of the future. The people however, need to ensure our bureaucrats are only a component, not the driver in the decision hierarchy that would be driven by real talent drawn from the various silos and empowered by a federal act. And that is going to be a tough call, given their entrenched positions - very much like the last gunman in Room 206 of Hotel Taj Mahal.