Framework: Indian Intelligence Apparatus

The premier Intelligence organizations in India are the Intelligence Bureau (IB) for internal intelligence and the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) for external intelligence. A number of other organizations have their own limited purpose intelligence organizations that are primarily information sinks or consumers, generating tactical level intelligence for their respective organizations. The IB, the RAW and the directorates of Military, Naval and Air Intelligence work under the Joint Integration Council, the apex body for integrating intelligence from disparate sources into a cohesive whole and then disemminating them to their consumers.

In this section, I intend to review the organization and functioning of the Indian intelligence apparatus from documents that are available in the public domain. Since a terror threat is ubiquitous by nature, counter-intelligence organizational elements specific to this type of threat will be the focus of much of my research. But first a quick backgrounder.

In Jul 1999, immediately after the Kargil war, the government constituted a committee (Kargil Review Committee) to look into the intelligence failure that led to the fiasco. The report of the committee, tabled in the parliament on Feb 23, 2003, was a scathing indictment of the state of the intelligence infrastructure of the country. The report stated in no unclear terms that there was a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels, that JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureauratic levels, that the assessment process has been downgraded in importance and consequently various agencies send very junior officials to JIC meetings and that the Chairmanship of the JIC had become the preserve of an IPS officer who was generally a runner-up for the post of Secretary (RAW) or DIB.

Further, there were no system of checks and balances to ensure that the intelligence consumer gets all that is due and available. There was no system of regular, periodic and comprehensive intelligence briefings at the political level and to the committee of secretaries. Bottomline, in the absence of an overall national security framework, each intelligence agency is diligent in preserving its own turf.

Most damagingly, the report stated that there was no evidence that the intelligence agencies conduct periodic review of their basic charter even in the face of evolving and changing patterns of threat perception - not after India went nuclear and nor even after insurgency and terror became a part of the fabric of life and death. The organization had deteriorated to yet another self-serving and bloated bureaucracy with capabilities last reviewed in the light of the security scenario of the cold-war , even though the budgetary allocation went up by an order of magnitudes considering the fact that in 1968, RAW had 250 agents and a budget of 2 crores. By 2000, the organization had expanded to about 10000 agents and a budget of 1500 crores.

Talk about empire building at its best!

Lets take a closer look at the two primary intelligence agencies in the country. First the RAW. Working directly in the cabinet secretariat (a part of the PMO), the RAW is India's foreign intelligence agency and an instrument of Indian national power with significant role in carrying out India's domestic and foreign policies. Founded in 1968, RAW focused largely on monitoring the political and military developments that affect national security in our immediate neighbourhood. RAW is headed by a Secretary. RAW enjoys a greater deal of autonomy in functioning than its western counterparts with direct access to the PM. Control of the cabinet secretary over RAW is limited to administrative and financial matters, with very little say in operational policy. On a daily basis, the Secretary (R) reports to the NSA. Structurally, RAW is organized by region with each having jurisdiction over a number of overseas stations. Intelligence is collected from a variety of sources by field officers and deputy field officers. This data is either pre-processed by a senior field officer or by a desk officer who then passes the information to the Joint Secretaries who in turn pass these inputs on to the Additional Secretaries level completing the analysis cycle. From here, the intelligence reports go out for dissemination to various intelligence consumers. Director RAW is a member of the JIC steering committee and authorised to brief the PM should the need arise. Liaison with other agencies are maintained through liaison officers or specially designated groups on deputation to RAW from their parent arms. Though RAW has its own specialized service cadre, several of its officers are drawn on deputation from other services.

Now lets take a look at the Central Intelligence Bureau (IB).

IB has in the past been tasked with all intelligence targeting, has since focused on internal security. The IB is officially under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), but in practice, its Director (DIB) is a member of the JIC and Steering Committee and has the authority to brief the PM should the need arise, but intelligence inputs (at least in theory) go through the regular channels in the MHA to the JIC.

Collection mechanisms of the IB vary depending on the region, but the IB operates both at the state level and the national level. Bulk of intelligence gathering is carried out by Grade II employees. The Class I officers carry out the coordination and higher-level management of the IB. Most of the grade 2 are cadre recruits or on deputation from state police while the class Is are deputed from state services.

At the state level all IB officers are part of the State Special Bureau and report to a Central Intelligence Officer who is also the intelligence advisor to the Governer. The IB maintains a large number of field units and headquarters and these along with its intricrate process of deputation provide a very organic system of vertical differentiation and linkages between state police agencies and the IB. Special units of the IB at the level of the center track issues like terrorism, counter-intelligence, VIP security, threat assessments and monitoring of sensitive areas.

Issues
One of the fundamental problems facing the intelligence community is with regard to staffing. In the past, postings and deputations to the IB were regarded as positive career choices among police officers and this led to a favourable buildup of expertise in both the state and national law enforcement circles. In more recent times, this has changed and state police postings offer far swifter means of promotion and career advancement. Besides, perks of the state level postings in some cases compare more favourably than those of a central posting. As a result, people have often to be forcibly deputed. The problem is further compounded by extremely hazardous duties in hostile populations often resulting in vacancies that go unfilled for months or even years leading to gaps in intelligence collection.

In certain sensitive areas, to increase the turnaround between collection and dissemination, IB officers serve to coordinate with regular law enforcement. To further lower the cycle time, law enforcement often setup their own intelligence gathering arms which, at least in theory, are supposed to coordinate with the IB for targeting. Many a time, this results in less than optimal levels of coordination or outright competition.

As a principle internal news agency, the intelligence apparatus is also responsible for monitoring all aspects of governance. As an extension of this role, it routinely monitors state governments and often draws up independent assessments of the security situation in a state for the Governer. At the central level, the IB closely monitors political parties and parliamentary affairs and resports back to the Cabinet Secretariat. Vital for maintaining the stability of elected governments, this role is easily subverted to acheive partisan objectives and lends to the general perception of the organization being a pawn in the hands of the ruling political party or coalition.

Other Agencies
Besides the R&AW and the CIB, there are numerous lesser intelligence apparatus functioning within and outside the country, among these the Defence Intelligency Agency (for military specific requirements of the three services), the National Facilities Technical Organization (NTFO), the Economic Intelligence Council under the Finance Ministry with its agencies - the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau and the Narcotics Control Bureau - operate in conjunction with enforcement arms and regulatory and investigative bodies like the RBI and CBI.

Conclusion
The intelligence apparatus in India is a result of an evolution of information requirements over the past 200 years or so. The structure and the culture of these organizations, working in close proximity to the centers of power and patronage, have demonstrated a proclivity to proliferate in headcount and budgetary allocations without serious considerations of efficiency or organizational effectiveness. The intelligence framework in the country is fragmented and fails spectacularly and periodically as the recent events in Mumbai have demonstrated so effectively. Yet there is no move to reform the intelligence community and bring about the level of integration required for it to deliver its mandate. Its a cozy setup that serves both the politician who has unlimited access to funds and resources and to the bureaucrats that serve in its plush offices in New Delhi, often jet-setting to congenial locales around the world on what is purpoted to be matters concerning national security interests. Despite that despicable fig leaf that is routinely proferred to avoid scrutiny, it is time that these organizations be thrown open to public audit.