New NSG-type unit for Maharashtra - typical knee jerk reaction of a jaded bureaucracy

The fires at the Taj, the Trident Oberoi and the Nariman House are still burning and our politicians and bureaucrats have come up with their formula for a silver bullet against the scourge of terror - a local force patterned on the NSG. The sheer audacity for politician to make that wide and sweeping statement without understanding its full import is a typical knee jerk reaction that one has come to expect from them. Unfortunately, it is not the politician who probably originated the idea. It is probably our omnipresent bureaucracy that did the background work to facilitate that statement. But do our bureaucrats understand what it entails? Who is most equipped to even arbitrate the discussion on whether a country like India would be most benefited if it were raised as a central, federal or state level organization? What would it take for a state like Maharashtra to raise an unit patterned on the NSG? Would it be a viable local counter terror response unit capable of undertaking the mission? To understand this we need to get to the bottom of the unit on which it is being patterned - the NSG itself.

The NSG is a voluntary force of professionals drawn from the Army and a number of para military organizations - the BSF, CRPF among others and represents a dated attempt to create a federal special forces unit that has the ethos of the Army Special Forces and an administrative apparatus that would enable such a force to operate under a federal ambit in conjunction with a states existing police organization. As such, it is organized into core strike elements - the Special Action Groups - drawing its ranks mainly from the Indian Army special forces units, the cordon elements - the Special Ranger Groups - drawing its ranks from the paramilitary forces, and numerous ancillary specialist units for combat, communication and logistic support and a training organization for induction and development. Other elements, especially its vital and integrated air component that was envisaged in its original vision is best left out of this discussion for the moment. The strike element draws its culture and ethos from an Army that is battle hardened through years of training, indoctrination and almost continuous exposure to low intensity conflicts and counter-insurgency operations in India and in other locations worldwide.

A force for Maharashtra would necessarily have to be a special police unit and would operate within the existing state police organizational hierarchy and be funded through state revenues. Mumbai, being the commercial capital, can most definitely finance the required headcount and provide them with the best equipment and training available to the world. So where is the problem? The problem lies in developing and sustaining the special forces culture and ethos.

The life of a soldier in a counter-terror unit is finite. It is an extremely high energy environment - both physically and mentally demanding - and it takes nearly a year for a soldier drawn from the Army to complete the full acculturation process. And for a new comer, the novelty wears out after a few operations as other normal life time events occur. It is an experience organization as distinguished from a career organization. People need to move on. New blood needs to be infused periodically and this new blood has to have a basic quality and calibre. How will an already overburdened police organization with its myriad responsibilities and numerous ongoing issues provide an nurturing environment for an ethos that takes even an organization like the Army years to build and then its designated role oriented environment, to sustain?